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ABSTRACT: Health care costs account for 17% of US GDP and many programs and policies 
seek to reduce these costs. This paper focuses on exercise as preventive care due to its immense 
physiological benefits. I model the profit-maximizing choice of health insurance companies to 
subsidize exercise and the utility-maximizing choice of individuals to engage in exercise using a 
traditional principal-agent framework. I then use principles from behavioral economics and 
psychology to critique these models and provide further insight into understanding our 
underconsumption of such preventive services. I end with an evaluation of current programs and 
suggestions for improvement using empirical findings. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 As the healthcare industry grows and health care costs rise, there is a strong focus on 
reducing health care costs, both for the societal benefits and for the increased profit for health 
insurance companies. The United States Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services report that 
national health expenditures reached $2.5 trillion in 2009, which translates to $8,086 per person 
or 17.6 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, 2011). This figure includes personal health care (hospital/dental care, physician and 
clinical services) as well as Medicare, Medicaid, private health insurance and out-of-pocket 
spending. Furthermore, estimates suggest that as much as one third of medical care does not 
actually improve our health (Gruber, 2011). These healthcare expenditures, effective or not, have 
been rising for many years (Figure 1) and many of these implicit costs are associated with 
outcomes that can be avoided, or at the very least, alleviated through preventive care. Therefore, 
it is in health insurance companies’ best interests to invest resources in programs and policies 
that promote preventive behavior.  
 This paper focuses on one type of preventive care – exercise – and discusses how it can 
be motivated through health insurance reimbursement or subsidies. The paper begins with a 
discussion of the benefits of exercise, followed by a description of the traditional economic 
approach to insurance. Included in this approach are two economic models – the profit-
maximization choice of insurance companies to incentivize preventive care and the utility-
maximizing choice of individuals to exercise. Following the models is a description of current 
fitness reimbursement programs and their encouraging results. I then provide a more critical 
analysis of the problem and the current system using insights from psychology and behavioral 
economics that can better help us understand the behavior as well as evaluate and improve the 
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programs that are currently in place, a step not taken in the literature thus far. I end with a brief 
empirical analysis of the choice to exercise, with implications for how subsidies should be 
targeted and delivered.  
II. Benefits of Exercise 
There are many benefits of exercise, both in terms of individual health and individual 
productivity. Perhaps most evident is the clear link between exercise and obesity, a growing 
problem in the United States. The age-adjusted prevalence of obesity in the United States 
between 2007 and 2008 was 33.8% (Flegal et al., 2010), and in 2010 no state had an obesity rate 
less than 20% (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). Obesity carries many health 
risks, including increased risk of hypertension, type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, sleep 
apnea, respiratory problems and even some cancers (Wang et al., 2008). Research has shown that 
exercise not only reduces obesity but also is associated with improvements in the risk and 
progression of diabetes (Manson et al., 1992, Gibala et al., 2012), cardiovascular disease and 
depression (Penedo & Dahn, 2005), hypertension, osteoporosis, and cancer (Warburton et al., 
2006).  If current trends in obesity continue (shown in Figure 2), total health-care costs 
attributable to obesity are estimated to more than double every decade, with costs ranging from 
$860 to $956 billion by 2030 (Wang et al., 2008). To put this figure in perspective, this is 17% of 
total health care costs, or roughly 1 in every 6 dollars spent on health care. Any efforts to reduce 
these huge increases in cost could be extremely effective in the long run.  
Shephard (1999) completed a meta-analysis of work-site exercise and health programs 
and showed that in addition to making employees healthier, exercise also improves worker 
productivity. Employees with on-site fitness programs were between 4% and 5% more 
productive than those without. Furthermore, those employers with such programs in place 
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experienced a cumulative benefit of $500 to $700 per worker per year for physical activity and 
aerobic fitness. Exercise, along with regular religious practice, also appears to have a positive 
impact on general well-being or happiness (Mochon, Norton & Ariely, 2007) – arguably reason 
enough for regular physical activity, let alone the immense physiological benefits. 
There is also substantial research on and public attention given to other benefits of 
exercise – with many academic studies on these benefits being publicized in large newspapers 
like The New York Times. In the past year alone, the following studies have received great 
media attention. Head et al. (2012) found that daily physical activity such as a walk or a jog 
reduces both the risk of developing Alzheimer’s and also has the potential to change the course 
of the disease should it develop. Another study underscores the importance of staying active by 
showing that exercise is crucial in the human body’s method of removing garbage or waste from 
inside its cells, a process called autophagy (He et al., 2012). Matsui et al. (2011) used rats to 
study how the brain fuels itself during exercise and showed that prolonged exercise significantly 
lowers the brain’s stores of energy, particularly in the frontal cortex and the hippocampus – areas 
involved in thinking and memory. A follow-up study showed that after exercise, a period of rest 
and eating restores brain levels of glycogen (a substance used for energy) as much as 60 percent 
above original levels (pre-exercise) in the frontal cortex and hippocampus – a sort of 
overcompensation for the loss experienced during exercise (Matsui et al., 2012). Further, they 
found that for continued exercise, the overcompensation level became the new normal level, with 
baseline levels of glycogen showing significant increases compared to sedentary subjects. This 
prolonged rise in fuel reserves has tremendous implications for not only the brain’s ability to 
sustain and direct movement, but also for sharper cognitive function given the associated areas.  
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Despite these benefits being widely acknowledged and often even understood, many 
people still have trouble getting themselves to the gym or even outside for a short run or bout of 
physical activity. The following section outlines current fitness incentive programs offered by 
health insurance companies in the US (as well as other exercise initiatives) that try to capitalize 
on these immense gains to exercise. 
III. Current Fitness Incentive Programs 
 Many incentive schemes like the one modeled above exist today, with some health 
insurance companies already publishing encouraging results. Table 1 displays the top 10 health 
insurance companies in the US (according to US News & World Report) and the different fitness 
incentive programs they offer.  Some programs include only educational resources and 
information, but many also offer monetary discounts or reimbursement for fitness memberships. 
Insurance companies throughout the US, the top-10 and others, offer a variety of programs aimed 
at motivating and incentivizing fitness. Tufts Health Plan’s “Fitness Rewards” and Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of Massachusetts’ “Fitness Benefit” programs offer members up to $150 back on 
fitness center membership only once they have been members of a fitness center for at least four 
months. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care and Harvard Pilgrim Health Care of New England offer 
similar reimbursement schemes to members. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Minnesota offers 
members up to $20 off of monthly health club membership fees if they meet attendance goals 
(typically 8-10 visits per month) and Connecticare of Connecticut also offers members 
discounted monthly membership fees. The structure of these reimbursement programs is 
typically retroactive; members submit a form to the health insurance provider with evidence of 
fitness membership payment/attendance. Should they meet the stipulations of the program, they 
are then reimbursed accordingly.  
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 With such reimbursement programs in place, it is important that the cost to the health 
insurance companies is offset by the health benefits (from the increase in exercise behavior) of 
members and the reduced medical costs paid by the insurance company. There is little publicized 
research in this domain; however, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Minnesota (2007) conducted a 
yearlong study of 74,000 members participating in their “Fitness Discounts” program. They 
found that frequent users (defined as using a fitness center at least eight times per month) had 
claim costs 17.8% lower than non-participants after adjusting for health history, as well as 
emergency room visit rates and hospital admission rates 38.7% and 41.4% lower than non-
participants, respectively. Their study also showed that the more workouts, the better. Frequent 
users had claim costs 9.8% lower than low users (defined as those who used a fitness center for 
fewer than eight times a month). Similarly, frequent user emergency room visit rates and hospital 
admission rates are 41.8% and 45.2% lower than low users. As of March 2007, roughly 90,000 
BCBS of MN members were enrolled in the program, representing about 10% of those eligible.  
Medica (2007) performed a similar analysis of members enrolled in their “Fit Choices” 
program who met the threshold for reimbursement of eight visits to a gym per month. Those who 
met the threshold had significantly lower costs for prescriptions, doctor appointments, and care 
at clinics and hospitals. The average monthly medical costs of these enrollees were 33.6% lower 
than those in a matched control group. These people also reported improvements not only 
regarding weight loss, but also in levels of energy and stress. People not enrolled in the “Fit 
Choices” program and who did not exercise eight times a month were 43%-105% more likely to 
have been to a clinic, hospital, or emergency room.  
While the BCBSMN and Medica studies do not have the benefit of inferring cause that 
can be isolated using randomized controlled field studies, and are likely prone to selection bias, 
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both studies are nonetheless suggestive and encouraging. Though it is likely that many members 
enrolled in such programs would exercise anyway, the programs likely still have the power to 
incentivize motivation for some who would not be engaging in physical activity otherwise. At 
the very least, their results clearly show the link between exercise and lower health-care costs. 
There is certainly cause for further research on the influence of such programs on physical 
activity and on their ultimate effectiveness in reducing claims costs, affecting the health 
insurance company’s bottom line.  
Research on the impact of incentives on exercise in other contexts is also encouraging. 
Charness and Gneezy (2009) carried out a study looking at the motivating effect of different 
monetary incentives to exercise. As part of the study, they compare the behaviors of participants 
randomized into three groups. All groups were given a handout on the benefits of exercise. One 
group was not given anything else (no incentive group). Participants in another group were 
additionally paid $25 to attend a gym once in a given week (low-incentive group) and 
participants in the other group were given the $25 incentive as well as $100 if they attended the 
gym eight more times in the following four weeks (high-incentive group). After observing 
attendance before, during and for a period of seven weeks after the end of the intervention, their 
main finding was that post-intervention attendance was more than twice as high for the high-
incentive group than for the no-incentive group (0.56 visits per week compared to 1.24 visits per 
week).  Furthermore, the difference did not decline at all during the time following payment, 
suggesting that their high-incentive scheme was successful in inducing posit habit formation. 
While the study shows that the dollar amount matters, the exact relationship between payment 
and amount exercised and whether or not it is continuous or incremental in nature, is not clear. 
These results have potential implications for the amount of reimbursement health insurance 
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companies provide – too little could not have the desired effect to truly reduce cost and too much 
could be unnecessary (and in other words, a waste for the health insurance company).  
It is evident that there is substantial variation in past and current approaches to motivating 
exercise habits. In an effort to understand and explain this variation, the following sections take a 
theoretical approach to the firm’s choice to subsidize exercise and the individual’s choice to 
exercise. The theoretical portion begins with a discussion of the traditional economic explanation 
of why people often remain sedentary and underinvest in beneficial measures of preventive care 
like exercise. 
IV. Traditional Economics of Insurance 
1. Overview 
 The economic principle of moral hazard is crucial in understanding the dynamics 
between health insurance companies and their customers. Consideration of this phenomenon 
lends itself to understanding why many people seemingly do not act in their own self-interest and 
behave in a way that is contrary to what is best for their health. 
 Moral hazard is the term used to describe a lack of motivation to guard against risk when 
one is protected or insulated from the risk’s consequences (Hölmstrom, 1979). Moral hazard is 
characterized by a situation where an individual makes a decision that is of higher risk, knowing 
another party will cover the cost, compared to the decision he would make if he were fully 
exposed to the risk. Moral hazard occurs in insurance markets because the behavior of the 
insured is affected by the insurance itself and the insured person’s actions affect the insurer’s 
costs. This is likely the reason why many individuals consume suboptimal levels of preventive 
care. For example, if someone has health insurance and chooses to not get immunized against a 
certain disease and then contracts it, the health insurance company bears the significant burden 
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of the financial cost of the disease. There is therefore little incentive for the individual to obtain 
the immunization. Another example may be engaging in poor dietary habits because the costs of 
ensuing problems like heart disease will be covered. The same intuition applies for exercise as a 
preventive action – many individuals see it as costly to exercise in the short run so they choose 
not to, and the cost of this lack of physical activity is shifted to the health insurer in the long run. 
This problem of moral hazard leads to a classical principal-agent problem where the principal 
(the insurer) attempts to alter the behavior of the agent (the insured) through an incentive 
scheme, described later on.  
An agent is anyone that is employed or managed by a principal and whose actions affect 
the principal. A principal-agent problem arises when agents pursue their own goals rather than 
the goals of principals. This problem is often discussed in the context of a business – it is costly 
for managers to oversee and monitor their workers. This leads to employees pursuing their own 
interests by shirking or engaging in other activities that reduce the firm’s profitability. Firms 
often respond to this principal-agent problem by offering bonuses, piece-rates or other 
performance incentives to better align the goals of their employees with those of the firm. 
This problem applies to insured parties as agents and the insurance companies as 
principals. Moral hazard arises because insured parties have less incentive to guard against risks, 
since they are protected from their consequences by the insurance. For example, a health 
insurance company lowers the cost to the insured of engaging in an unhealthy lifestyle because 
future hospital bills will be paid for by the insurance company. With this lower cost, individuals 
are more likely pursue a less healthy lifestyle, which raises the future costs of the insurance 
company that is insuring them. 
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In addition to moral hazard, our tendency to discount the future is also likely affecting 
our choices not to exercise. Put simply, discounting is the tendency of people to decrease the 
present value of rewards as they occur further and further into the future. For example, one 
values $100 obtained today more than the promise of $100 obtained tomorrow, and one values 
$100 tomorrow more than $100 the next day.  
The notion that discount rates are consistent over time is referred to as exponential 
discounting, and is represented by the following equation, where 0 < δ < 1 is the discount rate 
and δ = 1 implies no discounting: 
€ 
D(t) = δ t =1,δ,δ 2,δ 3,...    (1.1) 
This gives rise to the following equation for overall utility at time t, Ut, where ut represents the 
per-period utility occurring in future periods: 
€ 
Ut = ut +δut+1 +δ 2ut+2 +δ 3ut+3 + ...    (1.2) 
As shown in Eqs. (1.1) and (1.2), exponential discounting asserts that the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption at any two points in time depends exclusively on the distance 
between the two points. In other words, the value of a given reward decays by the same 
proportion for each time period (day, month, year) that the reward’s occurrence is delayed. For 
example, if δ = 0.5 and exercise lowers Ut by 1 and raises Ut+1 by 1.5, the individual will not 
choose to exercise even though |ΔUt| < |ΔUt+1| because |ΔUt| > δ |ΔUt+1|. Because the rewards of 
exercise often occur in the future, they are discounted by the individual and therefore less weight 
is placed on potential benefits when an individual makes a decision to or not to exercise. 
To combat both moral hazard and exponential discounting, health insurance companies 
pursue policies and programs like those outlined in the previous section. The incentive scheme of 
reimbursement can be modeled using the following traditional framework. 
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2. Theory: Health Insurer Decision 
 The following model is an adaption of that proposed by Pauly (1990). Consider the 
population of members insured by a health insurance company, N. Each individual in population 
N has two possible future states of health, H1 or H2. In H1, the insurance company’s medical 
expenditures on the individual, E, are zero because he does not incur any illness. In H2, however, 
the individual contracts an illness and medical expenditures on the individual are E > 0. A 
prevention service that reduces the risk of illness, in this case exercise or fitness, F, is available 
in the current period at a membership fee, P. If the prevention service is not consumed in the 
current period, the probability of state H2 occurring is pN. However, if the service is consumed, 
the probability of state H2 occurring is pY, where pY < pN. From the insurance company’s point of 
view, entire coverage of fitness is cost effective if the following condition holds: 
 
€ 
(pN − pY )⋅ E > PF  (2.1) 
In other words, if fitness lowers the expected future medical costs by more than the membership 
fee, the service is cost-effective.  
 Insurance companies can also choose to cover or reimburse only a fraction of fitness 
membership fees. Let K be the fraction of fitness membership fee (P) that is covered by 
insurance. In other words, K is the percentage of P that is paid by the health insurance company. 
If K = 1, the insurance company covers the entire price of the membership fee. If K = 0.25, the 
insurance company covers 25% of the membership fee, and so on. Because demand is a function 
of price and K effectively lowers the price of fitness memberships, demand for fitness 
memberships can thus be characterized by the following, where N is size of the total population: 
 
€ 
D1 = f (K)  (2.2) 
 
€ 
D2 = N −D1  (2.3) 
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Above, D1 refers to the subset of the population that consumes a fitness membership (F), given a 
certain level of K, while D2 refers to the remainder of the population that does not consume F.  
The partial derivatives of the demand equations with respect to K are shown below, with 
their expected signs: 
 
€ 
dD1
dK > 0  (2.4) 
 
€ 
dD2
dK < 0  (2.5) 
That is, for an increase in K (more coverage), D1 is expected to rise, while D2 is expected to fall.  
 The health insurance company’s total cost is dependent on both the reimbursement cost 
and the cost of illness and can be modeled by the following: 
 
€ 
θT = (D1⋅ K ⋅ P) + E(D1⋅ pY +D2 ⋅ pN ) (2.6) 
In the above equation, the left term on the right hand side, (D1⋅K⋅P), refers to current period costs 
– it is the product of the price the health insurance company pays for each membership (K⋅P), 
and the quantity of memberships consumed, D1. The right term on the right hand side shows 
future costs. Specifically, each group (D1 and D2) poses a different expected cost to the health 
insurance company in the future, characterized by the two groups’ differing probabilities of 
contracting an illness. The quantity in parentheses is thus the quantity of members expected to 
contract the illness and it is multiplied by the medical expenditure per individual with that 
illness, E. If the health insurance company chooses to set K > 0, and cover a certain portion of 
the fitness membership price, P, current expenses increase but future expenses fall.  
I use this conceptualization by Pauly (1990) to model the change in costs induced by 
changes in K. This is done by taking the partial derivative of Eq. (2.6) with respect to K, which 
yields the following equation: 
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€ 
dθ
dK = P(D1 +K ⋅
dD1
dK ) + E(pY ⋅
dD1
dK + pN ⋅
dD2
dD1
⋅
dD1
dK )       (2.7) 
Eq. (2.7) simplifies to the following, because we know the partial derivative of D2 with respect to 
D1: 
€ 
dθ
dK = P(D1 +K ⋅
dD1
dK ) + E
dD1
dK (pY − pN )         (2.8) 
Thus, the change in total costs is made up of an increase in current costs for the reimbursement 
and a decrease in the expected future costs due to more members consuming F (and a higher D1) 
with the higher reimbursement amount. Specifically, the left term on the right hand side of Eq. 
(2.8) is positive, because the partial derivative of D1 with respect to K is positive. The right term 
on the right hand side of Eq. (2.8) is negative because the positive partial derivative (dD1/dK) is 
positive and the quantity (pY – pN) is negative.  
To minimize costs, the health insurance company maximizes profit by setting the optimal 
level of K. This occurs when Eq. (2.8) is equal to zero and can be characterized by: 
 
€ 
K* = EP (pN − pY ) −
D1
ϕ
   where 
€ 
ϕ =
dD1
dK      (2.9) 
 According to Eq. (2.9), the larger the differential between pN and pY, the greater the 
subsidy (K) should be. This intuitively makes sense – the subsidy should be greater the more 
beneficial the preventive service (fitness) is for one’s health. The direct relationship between E 
and K also makes sense – the greater the medical expense to the insurer, the higher the subsidy 
should be. The term ϕ refers to how responsive members are to changes in K. Such knowledge 
has implications for how health insurance companies set K in their efforts to minimize costs and 
maximize profit in the long run. If consumers are very responsive to changes in K, rises in K will 
be associated with significantly greater reductions in future expected costs. However, if 
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consumers are less sensitive to changes in K, it may not be in the health insurance company’s 
best interest to adjust K because reductions in future costs may not offset the expenditure used in 
reimbursement.  
 If firms like health insurance companies are susceptible to the same discounting 
tendencies as individuals, the exponential discount rate, δ, would affect the medical expenditure 
variable, E, because it is a future cost. This changes the equation for the optimal K to the 
following: 
           
€ 
K* = δ⋅ EP (pN − pY ) −
D1
ϕ
       (2.10) 
With discounting behavior, the optimal K is directly related to the discount rate. As firms 
discount the future more and δ falls, the optimal level of K also falls because firms weigh and 
care about the future medical cost relatively less. Conversely, as firms care more about the future 
and δ increases, the optimal level of K rises and the forward-looking nature of the firm is in a 
sense transferred to the individual being subsidized. The following section models the individual 
choice to exercise or be a part of D1, given the level of K set by his/her health insurance 
company.  
3. Theory: Consumer Decision 
 The previous model presented the equation characterizing the optimal level of the subsidy 
for exercise, K*. Included in the equation is the relationship between changes in K and individual 
member behavior in consuming F (to be a part of D1). To better understand how this decision is 
made, it is important to understand how consumption of services like F and others affect a given 
individual’s lifetime utility function. For the following model, I use the conceptualization of 
utility given by Newhouse (2006): utility at time t is characterized by the following condition: 
 
€ 
Ut =U(Xt ,Ht (m,X)) (3.1) 
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In the above equation, X refers to non-medical goods and services consumed and H refers to a 
stock of health, which is dependent on both consumption of X and a stock of medical care, m 
(from consumption of medical goods and services). Both m and X are not subscripted to indicate 
that health depends on prior period consumption.  
In the case of this paper, I posit that exercise, or fitness (F) affects m in that it is a 
preventive medical service. In a two-period model, lifetime utility is characterized by: 
 
€ 
U =U[X1,H1(m1(1,F1),X1),X2,H2(m1(1,F1),m2(m1(1,F1),F2),X1,X2)] (3.2) 
 I also assume that the individual faces a budget constraint where lifetime income, I, is 
spent entirely on X and F in each period, priced as PX1,X2 and PF1,F2, respectively: 
€ 
I = ((1−K1)⋅ PF1 ⋅ F1) + ((1−K2)⋅ PF2 ⋅ F2) + (PX1 ⋅ X1) + (PX 2 ⋅ X2)                         (3.3) 
The individual chooses or plans levels of X1, X2, F1 and F2 in the first period and maximizes 
utility in Eq. (3.2) subject to (Eq. 3.3). This maximization is characterized by the following 
Lagrangian: 
 
€ 
Φ =U(X1,X2,H1,H2) − λ[((1−K1)⋅ PF1 ⋅ F1) + ((1−K2)⋅ PF2 ⋅ F2) + (PX1 ⋅ X1) + (PX 2 ⋅ X2)]    (3.4) 
This maximization yields first-order conditions in Eqs. (3.5), displayed in Table 2. It is important 
to note the multitude of elements that affect each marginal utility. For example, note the lasting 
effect of goods consumed in the first period on future period health, and thus utility. Simplified 
versions of the first-order conditions, after setting them equal to zero – Eqs. (3.6) – are displayed 
in Table 3.  
Combining several of the first order conditions yields the following two equations, 
representing the tradeoff between X and F within each period: 
€ 
MUX1
MUF1
=
PX1
(1−K1)⋅ PF1
         (3.7) 
  16	  
€ 
MUX 2
MUF2
=
PX 2
(1−K2)⋅ PF2
         (3.8) 
The above equations show that within each period, the marginal utility the individual derives 
from both X and F is related to the value of K. For an increase in K in either period, the price 
ratio increases and to maintain equilibrium, either MUX must increase or MUF must fall – this 
occurs when consumption of F increases and/or X decreases. Intuitively, this makes sense 
because an increase in K is effectively lowering the price of F, leading to increased consumption. 
The first order conditions can also be combined to show the between period trade-offs of 
consuming X and F.  
 
€ 
MUX1
MUX 2
=
PX1
PX 2
         (3.9) 
       
€ 
MUF1
MUF2
=
(1−K1)⋅ PF1
(1−K2)⋅ PF2
       (3.10) 
 The relationship in Eq. (3.10) shows that the marginal utility the individual derives from 
fitness in each period is related to the health insurance company’s choice of K in each period. 
This is because the individual derives marginal utility from the quantities of F1 and F2 consumed, 
which in turn depend on the values of K. For example, an increase in K1 decreases the value of 
the price ratio in Eq. (3.10), and to maintain equilibrium, it follows that MUF1 must fall and/or 
MUF2 must rise. Because marginal utility of F1 falls as consumption of F1 increases (and the 
converse for F2), the ultimate result of an increase in K1 must be an increase in F1 and/or a 
decrease in F2. In this case, an increase in K1 is analogous to the introduction of a subsidy for 
exercise. Similarly, an increase in K2 increases the value of the price ratio, and now MUF1 must 
rise and/or MUF2 must fall, or, consumption of F1 must fall and/or consumption of F2 must rise.  
It is also possible to create comparative statics from the first order conditions that show 
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substitution between F in one period and X in the other due to the planning nature of the model. 
For example, the consumer may choose to substitute towards F1 at not only at the expense of X1 
but also/instead at the expense of X2. 
Thus far I have assumed no discounting on the part of the member when weighing 
second-period utility. However, since we know that individuals do discount the future and its 
benefits, it is important to observe how the previous analysis changes when discount rates are 
introduced.  
 Using a model of traditional exponential discounting, where individuals discount or 
weigh future outcomes with a constant discount rate δ, lifetime utility can be characterized by: 
€ 
Ut = δ i
i=0
n
∑ ut+1       (3.11) 
 Translated into the two-period model of this paper, lifetime utility is then characterized 
by the following expression: 
   
€ 
U = u[X1,H1,(m1,X1)]+δ⋅ u[X2,H2(m1,m2,X1,X2)]     (3.12) 
Conceptually, this yields first order conditions such that the marginal utility of anything in the 
future (H2 or X2) is discounted by δ, and worth less to the individual at time 1, when decisions 
are made. This gives rise to a new set of ratios representing utility maximization between 
periods, shown below: 
 
€ 
MUX1
δ⋅ MUX 2
=
PX1
PX 2
 (3.13) 
 
€ 
MUF1
δ⋅ MUF2
=
(1−K1)⋅ PF1
(1−K2)⋅ PF2
 (3.14) 
 The same interpretation of Eq. (3.10) holds for Eq. (3.14), however, the marginal utility 
of F2 is now modified by the traditional exponential discount rate, δ, which affects all future 
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periods. Relative to the previous case where δ =1, the same increase in K1 means that MUF1 must 
be relatively lower and/or MUF2 must be relatively higher. That is, the individual must increase 
consumption of F1 or decrease consumption of F2. This makes sense intuitively because 
discounting of future benefits of exercise (MUF2) would lead the consumer to plan to consume 
less of F2. The next section provides a more critical look at this choice to exercise and the 
associated incentive programs, using a behavioral economic and psychological perspective.  
V. Insights from Psychology & Behavioral Economics 
 While the previous two models are useful in understanding the individual choice to 
exercise, and the health insurance company’s attempt to influence that choice, both models do 
not capture the entire reality of the problem. Insights from both behavioral economics and 
psychology can help to further explain and understand the apparent underconsumption of clearly 
beneficial activities. Furthermore, this additional perspective improves our ability to evaluate the 
relative potential effectiveness of current programs or policies aimed at solving the problem and 
suggest improvements. 
Understanding the Problem 
Contrary to traditional beliefs about exponential discounting, research has shown that 
exponential discounting is not actually as common as one might believe, and in fact, people often 
hyperbolically discount, and place additional weight on the present (Laibson, 1997). In 
hyperbolic discounting, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is not exclusively 
dependent on the distance between two consumptions points in time. A situation of exponential 
discounting posits that if I prefer $100 today to $110 tomorrow, then I would also prefer $100 a 
year from now to $110 a year and one day from now, but when given this choice, many would be 
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willing to wait the additional day to receive $110 a year from now, suggesting that discount rates 
are not constant over time.  
A comparison between traditional exponential discounting rates and hyperbolic 
discounting rates over time is shown in Figure 3. There are two key differences in the features of 
the curves. In the hyperbolic function, there is a steep initial drop off point showing present-bias 
and the immediate higher discounting of future rewards. The hyperbolic function also becomes 
flatter than the exponential function, showing that delayed rewards are less discounted in 
hyperbolic models than in exponential models.  
Hyperbolic discounting would be observed with exercise in that the trade-off rates between 
today and the metaphorical tomorrow are different than the trade-off rates between tomorrow 
and the next day. This difference often leads to preference reversals or a situation of dynamic 
inconsistency, the term given to the situation that arises when a decision-maker’s preferences 
change over time (Bénabou, 2002). This can be easily understood by thinking of decision-makers 
as consisting of many selves over time – a today self, a tomorrow self, etc – that do not hold 
aligned preferences. For example, in the evening before bed, one may decide to set an alarm for 
6:00 am but come the morning, the person actually prefers an extra hour of sleep and wakes up at 
7:00 am. The same logic can be used to explain the procrastination of exercise – a person may 
decide on Friday to exercise on Monday, but come Monday, the person’s preferences have 
changed and exercising is no longer a top priority.  
In contrast to the standard model of exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting 
makes overall utility at time t, Ut, equivalent to: 
€ 
Ut = ut + βδut+1 + βδ 2ut+2 + βδ 3ut+3 + ...       (5.1) 
or  
€ 
Ut = ut + β(δut+1 +δ 2ut+2 +δ 3ut+3 + ...)        (5.2) 
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Above, δ is the standard exponential discounting rate, and β is the hyperbolic discount rate, 
which represents our tendency to overvalue the present and uniformly discount all future periods,  
DellaVigna (2009) uses the following (β,δ) model to illustrate the case of preference 
reversal and self-control problems that occur with exercise. Consider three time periods, denoted 
t0, t1 and t2. In the first and second periods, the decision maker or agent is a “planner” and 
“doer”, respectively. Exercise is a good with both an immediate cost (b1, which is negative), 
incurred in the second period (t1), and a future benefit (b2), experienced in the third period (t2). 
From an ex ante perspective, the planner will plan to exercise at t1 if βδb1 + βδ2b2 > 0, or: 
         
€ 
b1 +δb2 ≥ 0         (5.3) 
Above, β cancels out because all payoffs are in the future. However, when the time comes to 
exercise, the agent actually does so only if this new condition holds: 
       
€ 
b1 + βδb2 ≥ 0          (5.4) 
Note here that β applies to the second term on the left-hand side because it is occurring in 
the future, but not the first because the present is now t1. For certain values of b1, b2, β and δ, the 
agent will plan to exercise but choose not to when the time comes. For example, if b1 = -6, b2 = 
8, β = ½ and δ = 1, the agent plans to exercise because Eq. (5.3) is positive, but ultimately does 
not exercise because Eq. (5.4) is negative. This preference reversal occurs because when the time 
comes to exercise, the future benefit is discounted by the hyperbolic discount rate β and the 
relatively more salient current costs overpower the future benefit. 
Consistent with the example above, Leibman and Zeckhauser (2008) explain that this 
behavior is common, where many people tend to underinvest in preventive measures like 
exercise due to overweighting of current-period costs and underweighting of future-period 
benefits. Such is the nature of exercise – though there are several short-term or immediate 
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benefits of exercise (for example, heightened energy), many of the benefits are experienced later 
and are not salient at the time the action occurs. Therefore, in addition to mitigating the moral 
hazard and exponential discounting problems, subsidizing the costs associated with preventive 
care helps to overcome the underconsumption of such care by people who act under the 
inefficient conditions of dynamic inconsistency. In essence, subsidies like those in fitness 
reimbursement schemes operate to decrease our assessment of the immediate cost of exercise, b1, 
leading us to choose to exercise as a “doer”, not only as a planner.  
It is worthwhile, also, to consider the discounting behavior on the part of the health insurer 
in more detail. If consumers act under conditions like hyperbolic discounting, leading to 
preference reversals, it follows that firms may do the same and in addition to exponential 
discounting, also fall victim to present-biased decisions. However, an argument can be made that 
firms are less prone to these biases due to their scale, organization, experience and exposure to 
competition. In his book The Visible Hand, Alfred Chandler (1977) explains the emergence of 
the managerial structure of firms and highlights the fact that managers prefer policies that are 
geared towards long-term stability and growth to policies that solely maximize current profits. 
Chandler (1990) goes into greater depth describing the organization of modern businesses, 
explaining that the modern industrial firm is defined as “a collection of operating units, each with 
its own specific facilities and personnel, whose combined resources and activities are 
coordinated, monitored, and allocated by a hierarchy of middle and top managers.” In many 
firms, one of these units specializes in long-term thinking and carries out activities such as 
research and development, hiring consultants and analysis of large data sets (e.g. data on past 
experience). Such specialization leads to efficient resource utilization and reductions in costs.  
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The fact that firms are subject to competition also serves to reduce the incidence of 
present-bias, as those firms that are less rational are less likely to survive – firms that are 
predominantly forward-looking ultimately outcompete those who only focus on the present.  
Even if firms were to have nonstandard features, they still have the incentive to respond to the 
nonstandard features of consumers – the principal-agent framework is not escapable and it will 
always be in a firm’s best interest to pursue policies or programs that mitigate the problem.  
Evaluating Health Behavior Change Programs/Policies 
 In efforts to predict and evaluate the relative effectiveness of various behavior-change 
policies, there should be consideration of how certain programs influence the decision-making 
process and what they assume to be the underlying factor driving the problem. The designs of the 
various interventions that exist today suggest what the insurer hypothesizes as to the cause of the 
problem. Educational modules, pamphlets and online tutorials aim suggest that our failure to 
exercise at optimal levels is at least in part due to a lack of information. For some individuals, it 
may be sufficient to provide them with a brochure on the long-term benefits to incite behavior 
change. For others, however, the problem comes down to more than simple lack of knowledge or 
misunderstanding of the advantages of regular physical activity. Programs that offer monetary 
incentives, however, acknowledge that there is more to the problem than just a deficiency of 
information. Health insurers and employers incentivize people financially because they 
understand that humans often require the additional nudge to change behavior.   
In the three-period (β,δ) model, it is possible that educational approaches operate to 
exclusively increase b2, while financial incentives like monthly reimbursement serve to reduce 
current period valuations of the costs of exercise, making b1 less negative. This idea will be 
further explored in Section V. Because discount rates are so powerful, it may be that investing in 
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and developing programs or policies with rewards that cannot be discounted are more likely to 
change behavior. These will be programs that affect our perception and valuation of immediate 
rewards versus delayed rewards. In fact, research has shown that in the human brain, separate 
neural systems evaluate the two types of rewards (McClure et al., 2004). This shows that we 
think about them differently and arguably therefore modify our behavior based on them 
differently. While there is some worry that offering extrinsic incentives can undermine intrinsic 
interest (Lepper, Greene and Nisbett, 1973), it is also possible that extrinsic incentives can be 
used effectively to change behavior, particularly when the level of initial intrinsic interest in the 
activity is low and when the activity is one whose attractiveness becomes apparent after 
engaging in it for a prolonged period of time. Marteau, Ashcroft, and Oliver (2009) share this 
view, explaining “offering a reward can help people to align their actions more closely with their 
true preferences. From such a perspective, incentives operate to enhance rather than to restrict 
autonomy.” 
Ariely and Norton (2008) explain that actions can also often create, not just reveal, 
preferences. They argue that a person’s actions are determined not only by the hedonic utility of 
those options but also of their memories for past actions that have been influenced by random 
situational factors. These memories then shape future utilities and thus future actions. In the case 
of physical activity, exercising in the context of an incentive or in another type of random 
positive environment may lead to the creation of a preference for the activity that the individual 
views as reflective of his or her stable preferences. A similar phenomenon is the “learning-by-
doing” concept in economic theory where workers are able to improve their productivity through 
repetition of a given action (Hall and Rosenberg, 2010). 
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 Furthermore, psychological literature on positive addiction suggests that once certain 
behaviors are undertaken, people can become addicted to their positive psychological effects, a 
phenomenon pioneered and first described by Glasser (1976). He explains that a positive 
addiction is an activity that increases one’s mental strength and when missed results in some 
kind of misery, pain, or upset (psychological or physical). The activity causes a pleasurable, 
sometimes even euphoric mental state, which he describes as trancelike and transcendental. He 
writes that running, and other types of exercise, as well as meditation, are particularly amenable 
to this phenomenon. Specifically, he outlines six criteria for a positive addiction: (1) it is 
something noncompetitive that you choose to do and you can devote an hour (approximately) a 
day to it; (2) it is possible for you to do it easily and it does not take a great deal of mental effort 
to do it well; (3) you can do it alone or rarely with others but it does not depend upon others to 
do it; (4) you believe that it has some value (physical, mental, or spiritual) for you; (5) you 
believe that if you persist at it you will improve, but this is completely subjective – you need to 
be the only one who measures that improvement; (6) the activity must have the quality that you 
can do it without criticizing yourself. Glasser also points out that addiction to exercise or running 
does not come quickly, with many runners needing to build enough endurance so that they can 
run effortlessly before they truly reap the mental effects. Such is likely another reason why 
humans have difficulty starting and maintaining regular exercise routines – the short-term 
benefits are ironically not necessarily immediately available and the long-term benefits are 
discounted and therefore not as salient as current costs. 
 More recent evidence on running/exercise addiction has confirmed Glasser’s position. 
Perkins (1988) studied 100 runners, 99% of which reported feeling a positive addicted state, 
described as a transcendental, trance-like state that was characterized by free mental relaxation 
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and euphoria. Furthermore, 98% of the runners explained that they experience discomfort when a 
planned run is missed. Griffiths (1997) attempted to explain the positive addiction to running 
with an endorphin hypothesis, suggesting that the addiction is a result of “endogenous 
morphines” or endorphins that are produced with exercise, that lead to an enhanced mood. Leedy 
(2009) conducted a qualitative study of long-distance running in women and found that all 
women used running as a way to cope with emotional stress, supporting the idea that exercise 
and running lead to better mood states. Cox and Orford (2004) found similar results after 
interviewing avid exercisers – participants in the study reported both short-term (a ‘buzz’, 
feelings of enjoyment and satisfaction, and improved mood) and long-term (improved health, 
fitness, confidence and general well-being) payoffs to exercise that jointly affected their habits or 
addiction to the behavior. Many studies have also looked into negative exercise addiction or 
exercise dependence, suggesting that there is a fine line between the aforementioned positive 
addictive aspect of exercise and the negative dependent nature that some individuals experience 
that ends up being detrimental to their health (Smijewski & Howard, 2003; Allegre et al., 2006; 
MacLaren & Best, 2007; Adams, 2009).  
Improving Health Behavior Change Programs/Policies 
 Given the aforementioned phenomena and research, it is evident that current policies and 
programs could be improved. It could be that people need only be incentivized to or reimbursed 
for exercise for a limited period of time, just enough to allow for the habit to develop and for 
individuals to feel to develop a true preference or feel positively addicted. In an ideal world, each 
individual would only be reimbursed for the length of time it takes for the habit to develop and 
the individual to engage in the behavior with or without incentives in place. While ideal, it is not 
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realistically feasible due to the great variation that exists among people in developing habits and 
the difficulty that would come with implementing such a complicated system of rewards.  
 It is also worthwhile to consider alternate means for the health insurance company to 
monitor or track people’s behavior. Using the quantity of visits to the gym does not guarantee 
that the time is spent effectively or in some cases spent at all. It may be beneficial for insurers to 
move towards more biometric measures of fitness and reward individuals based on weight-loss 
or cardiac fitness. This would allow them to have a more accurate assessment of how the fitness 
or exercise is affecting their members’ health and would arguably increase the salience of the 
benefits of exercise for members. For example, one may begin to see more value in exercising if 
he/she can and must observe how his/her heart rate or BMI is changing over time. Again, 
however, this could be costly and not very practical. A potential compromise could be to use a 
system where people are rewarded in a point accumulation system where points are assigned 
based on time spent exercising or machines/facilities used.  The following section revisits the 
individual choice to exercise, taking an empirical approach to the assessment of the costs and 
benefits of exercise as described in the (β, δ) hyperbolic discounting model. 
VI. Empirics 
1. Design 
 In order to further investigate my hypothesis as to the differential influence of incentive 
programs versus more educational/informative interventions on individual assessments of the 
cost and benefit, I conducted the following empirical study. I used a between-subjects design 
where 194 participants aged 13-85 completed a survey that asked them to assess the cost of a 
given exercise routine (b1) as well as their valuation of the benefits of the routine (b2). The 
exercise routine was given as exercising for at least one hour, two times per week for three 
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months. Before answering the cost and benefit questions, participants were primed to one of 
three conditions (two experimental and one control). The first experimental condition consisted 
of a monetary incentive prime in which participants were instructed to imagine they were 
enrolled in an incentive program that rewarded them with a cash subsidy for exercising each 
month. Specifically, the prime read:  
While completing this survey, please imagine that you're in the following situation: You have just 
enrolled in a fitness benefits program via your Health Insurance Company that will indefinitely 
reward you for exercising regularly. According to the plan, your Health Insurance Company will 
pay $20 of your monthly gym membership If you attend the health club 8 or more times in that 
month (roughly two visits per week). If you meet or exceed attendance goals, you will receive  
this reimbursement via a check at the end of each month. 
The second experimental prime was educational in nature – participants were instructed to read 
an abridged version (see Appendix) of a report published by the Mayo Clinic (2011) on the 
benefits of physical activity. For the control condition, subjects were primed with a neutral 
prime, which discussed the tenants of the Affordable Care Act proposed by the current President, 
Barack Obama (see Appendix). After priming, each subject was asked to recall and summarize 
what he or she had received in the prime part of the survey. Participants that failed to complete 
this portion of the survey were excluded from analysis. 
 The next part of the survey consisted of three questions. The first question asked 
participants how they would value the cost (financial and non-financial) of the exercise routine 
(b1), the second asked participants how large of a benefit they would expect from the routine, and 
the third question asked participants how much they would value this benefit (b2). All answers 
were restricted to multiple-choice on a Likert scale from 1-10 where higher numbers signify 
greater cost or greater benefit. The final portion of the survey asked participants to answer a set 
of demographic questions including sex, age, educational status and employment status. 
Participants were also asked to provide information on their current exercise habits and on their 
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perceptions of their current weight and level of fitness. Data was collected with SurveyMonkey 
and analyzed using SPSS Statistical Software. 
2. Results  
 To test the hypotheses that an incentive scheme reduces an individual’s evaluation of the 
current-period cost of exercise and an educational intervention increases an individual’s 
evaluation of future benefits, mean cost and benefit values were compared across the three 
conditions (displayed in Table 4). Neither the monetary incentive nor health benefits conditions 
differed significantly from the control in evaluations of cost, but a marginally significant 
difference was observed between the monetary incentive and health benefits conditions (M=4.69 
vs. M=5.38, p=0.075), suggesting that there is a cost-reducing nature to monetary incentive 
programs. There were no significant differences observed amongst the three conditions for 
valuations of the benefits of exercise, suggesting that educational interventions may not affect 
individual perceptions of the benefits of exercise. 
 In addition to the general effect of the different conditions on valuations of costs and 
benefits, the prime effect was also tested within smaller groups defined by age, sex, weight and 
current exercise habits. Of note in these analyses are the following results. Infrequent exercisers, 
defined as exercising less than or equal to two times per week, in the monetary incentive 
condition perceive the cost to be significantly lower compared to participants in the control 
condition (M=5.11 vs. M=6.42, p<0.05).  Frequent exercisers, defined as those who exercise 
more than two times per week, in the monetary incentive condition perceive the cost to be 
marginally significantly lower compared to participants in the health benefits condition (M=4.42 
vs. M=5.38, p=0.056). Older adults, greater than 25 years of age, in the monetary incentive 
condition also perceive cost to be marginally significantly less than those primed with health 
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benefits (M=4.85 vs. M=5.88, p=0.091). Finally, participants that consider themselves to be 
overweight or obese evaluate the value of exercise to be marginally significantly less in the 
incentive condition compared to those in the control condition (M=7.50 vs. M=8.38, p=0.073). 
No effects were observed within young adults (less than or equal to 25 years of age) or those 
who consider themselves to be underweight or of normal weight.  
 A final set of exploratory analyses was conducted to see if valuations of the costs and 
benefits of exercise vary by groups, independent of condition. These analyses revealed that 
females value the benefit of exercise to be significantly higher than males (M=7.77 vs. M=6.98, 
p=0.013). As one might expect, frequent exercisers also perceive the cost of exercise to be 
significantly lower compared to less-frequent exercisers (M=4.63 vs. M=5.52, p<0.01).  No 
difference was observed in these participants’ perception of the benefits of exercise. Participants 
who consider themselves to be normal or underweight perceive the cost to be significantly higher 
than participants who consider themselves overweight or obese (M=5.11 vs. M=4.41, p=0.05). 
No differences emerged between ages or by student or employment status. While these results 
are suggestive, it is important to note that because no corrections were performed for the 
experiment-wise alpha, the results from the reported t-tests may be affected. Future research 
should correct for the large number of comparisons to ascertain the true relationships.  
3. Implications 
 The results from this study have substantial implications for current fitness incentive or 
subsidy programs. The difference in cost perceptions observed across all participants between 
those in the incentive condition versus those in the health benefits conditions suggests that 
incentives do operate, to some extent, to reduce perceived cost and are likely to lead to changes 
in behavior. Furthermore, the differential effect of the different primes by groups suggest that to 
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achieve optimal results, incentive programs should potentially vary by groups. Current exercise 
habits predict different responses to the subsidies as well as age and weight status. The 
exploratory analyses by the smaller groups also suggest that current subsidy programs should be 
more tailored to individual characteristics. Perhaps females and those who already exercise 
frequently should be subsidized less and individuals with different weight statuses should receive 
different subsidies. As previously mentioned, however, there are concerns of fairness, therefore it 
may be moral to avoid essentially price-discriminating by arbitrary characteristics (sex and age) 
and focus exclusively on those that the individual can control or influence more easily (current 
habits and weight). While the hypothetical nature of the study is limiting, these results show that 
there is variation both across different groupings of individuals and in responsiveness to the three 
conditions. Future research is necessary and would be beneficial to provide greater insight as to 
how incentive schemes can be designed to achieve the best outcomes. An analogous system is 
auto-insurance companies using monitors in members’ cars that track driving behavior, which in 
turn, affects the rates charged to the member. 
VII. Conclusion 
 This paper sought to model the individual choice to exercise and the health insurance 
company’s subsidy for the behavior, as well as provide insight as to the optimal subsidy for such 
behavior. A traditional principal-agent framework is necessary and useful in understanding the 
problem: including both models for each decision maker’s choice – the health insurance 
company choosing to set their amount of reimbursement and the individual choosing to exercise 
given that effective subsidy. A traditional economic approach, however, is not sufficient for this 
goal and is not able to fully explain or capture the essence of the problem. The phenomenon of 
hyperbolic discounting from the field of behavioral economics as well as insights from 
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psychology facilitate a deeper, more realistic understanding of the problem and therefore allow 
us to better design solutions. The empirical evidence provided further shows the need for careful 
design of programs that target individual characteristics rather than the insured population as a 
whole. It is only once we understand the root of a problem that we can effectively respond and 
find a solution. In the case of exercise and physical activity, the immense physiological and 
mental benefits can and hopefully will lead to not only lower costs but a generally happier, 
healthier population.  
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Tables & Figures 
Figure 1: US National Health Expenditures 2000-2009 
Source: https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/ 
 
 
Figure 2: Age-adjusted Prevalence of Overweight, Obesity, and Extreme Obesity among US 
Adults aged 20 and over 
Source: http://www.cdc.gov/NCHS/data/hestat/obesity_adult_07_08/obesity_adult_07_08.pdf 
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Figure 3: Exponential vs. Hyperbolic Discounting 
 
 
Table 1: Top 10 Health Insurance Companies (as ranked by US News and World Report) 
Source: http://health.usnews.com/health-plans/national-insurance-companies 
 
Name Size Type of Fitness Incentive 
Unitedhealth Group 75 million D, W 
Wellpoint Inc. Group 66 million D, W 
Kaiser Foundation Group 8 million D 
Aetna Group 41 million D, P 
Humana Group 12 million P 
HCSC Group 13 million D 
Coventry Corp. Group 5 million D, P 
Highmark Group 5 million D 
Independence Blue Cross Group 3 million D 
   
D=Discounted gym memberships   
W=worksite options   
P=wellness/education programs   
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Table 2: First Order Conditions without Discounting Behavior 
Equations (3.5) from the Consumer’s Decision 
€ 
dΦ
dX1
=
dU
dX1
+
dU
dH1
⋅
dH1
dX1
+
dU
dH2
⋅
dH2
dX1
− λ⋅ PX1 = 0 (3.5a) 
€ 
dΦ
dX2
=
dU
dX2
+
dU
dH2
⋅
dH2
dX2
− λ⋅ PX 2 = 0 (3.5b) 
€ 
dΦ
dF1
=
dU
dH1
(dH1dm1
⋅
dm1
dF1
) + dUdH2
(dH2dm1
⋅
dm1
dF1
+
dH2
dm2
⋅
dm2
dm1
⋅
dm1
dF1
) − λ⋅ (1−K1)⋅ PF1 = 0  (3.5c) 
€ 
dΦ
dF2
=
dU
dH2
(dH2dm2
⋅
dm2
dF2
) − λ⋅ (1−K2)⋅ PF2 = 0 (3.5d) 
€ 
dΦ
dλ = I − ((1−K1)⋅ PF1 ⋅ F1) + ((1−K2)⋅ PF2 ⋅ F2) + (PX1 ⋅ X1) + (PX 2 ⋅ X2) = 0 (3.5e) 
 
 
 
Table 3: Simplified First-Order Conditions without Discounting Behavior 
Equations (3.6) from the Consumer’s Decision 
€ 
MUX1 = λ⋅ PX1  (3.6a) 
€ 
MUX 2 = λ⋅ PX 2  (3.6b) 
€ 
MUF1 = λ⋅ (1−K1)⋅ PF1  (3.6c) 
€ 
MUF2 = λ⋅ (1−K2)⋅ PF2  (3.6d) 
€ 
I = ((1−K1)⋅ PF1 ⋅ F1) + ((1−K2)⋅ PF2 ⋅ F2) + (PX1 ⋅ X1) + (PX 2 ⋅ X2)  (3.6e) 
 
Table 4: Mean Cost & Benefit Values by Prime 
  Cost (b1) Benefit  (b2) 
Fitness Incentive 4.69* 7.29 
Health Benefits 5.38* 7.79 
Control 4.87 7.74 
Total 4.94 7.56 
Note: * indicates marginally significant difference 
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Appendix 
Health Benefits Prime 
Please read the following excerpt on the benefits of regular physical activity. 
(Source: Mayo Clinic) 
 
Want to feel better, have more energy and perhaps even live longer? The benefits of exercise are 
yours for the taking, regardless of your age, sex or physical ability. 
 
No. 1: Exercise controls weight 
Exercise can help prevent excess weight gain or help maintain weight loss. When you engage in 
physical activity, you burn calories. The more intense the activity, the more calories you burn. 
 
No. 2: Exercise combats health conditions and diseases 
Being active boosts high-density lipoprotein (HDL), or 'good,' cholesterol and decreases 
unhealthy triglycerides. This one-two punch keeps your blood flowing smoothly, which 
decreases your risk of cardiovascular diseases. Regular physical activity can also help prevent or 
manage stroke, metabolic syndrome, type 2 diabetes, depression, certain types of cancer, arthritis 
and falls. 
 
No. 3: Exercise improves mood 
Physical activity stimulates various brain chemicals that may leave you feeling happier and more 
relaxed. Exercising regularly can also boost your confidence and improve your self-esteem. 
 
No. 4: Exercise boosts energy 
Regular physical activity can improve your muscle strength and boost your endurance.  
 
No. 5: Exercise promotes better sleep 
Regular physical activity can help you fall asleep faster and deepen your sleep. 
 
No. 6: Exercise puts the spark back into your sex life 
Regular physical activity can lead to enhanced arousal for women. And men who exercise 
regularly are less likely to have problems with erectile dysfunction than are men who don't 
exercise. 
 
No. 7: Exercise can be fun 
It gives you a chance to unwind, enjoy the outdoors or simply engage in activities that make you 
happy alone or with others. 
 
Neutral Prime 
 
The Affordable Care Act, a bill recently passed by the Obama Administration, puts individuals, 
families and small business owners in control of their health care. It reduces premium costs for 
millions of working families and small businesses by providing hundreds of billions of dollars in 
tax relief – the largest middle class tax cut for health care in history. 
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